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ABSTRACT: If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I 
tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentac-
counts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue 
that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into 
mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I propose a notion of mnemonic 
Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs.  
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1. Introduction 
Memories, like other mental states such as beliefs or perceptual experiences, are inten-
tional states. Memories have content in the minimal sense that, if a subject remembers 
something, the world is thereby presented to her as having been in a certain way. The 
aim of this essay is to investigate how we should construe the content of memories.1 
For the sake of simplicity, I shall concentrate on those memories that we report as be-
ing about events in the outside world, such as those memories that we express by ut-
tering sentences like ‘I remembered that there was a book on this table an hour ago’ 
or ‘I remember that you were at the party on Friday’. What sorts of things do memo-
ries like these put us in cognitive contact with? Are they, as our verbal reports suggest, 
events in the outside world? Are they mental events?  
 In section two, I will delimit the project. First, I will distinguish two varieties of 
memory, ‘episodic’ and ‘semantic’, and point out that our project only concerns the 
former variety of memory. Next, I will say more about what I mean by the content of 
a mental state by using the notion of truth-conditions. Then, I will specify the general 
form of a proposal about the content of memories. Finally, I will highlight two fea-
tures of episodic memories that will constrain the task of determining what those 
memories are about. These features concern the relation between memory and belief. 
Basically, they amount to the fact that, when a subject episodically remembers some-
thing, she is inclined to believe two things. She is inclined to believe of the remem-
bered event that it took place in the past. And she is inclined to believe that she has 
perceptually experienced it. I will take it to be an important virtue of any construal of 
the content of memories that it accounts for those two connections between memory 
and belief. 
                                                     
1 I shall use the following locutions equivalently: ‘the content of A is that p’, ‘A is about p being the case’ 
and ‘p being the case is the object of A’ where ‘A’ stands for an intentional state and ‘p’ for an event. 
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 Section three will be concerned with the belief that one has perceptually experi-
enced the event that one apparently remembers. I will explore a certain kind of strat-
egy for explaining the inclination to have this belief when one episodically remembers 
something. This type of strategy builds a reference to the subject’s perceptual experi-
ences into the content of her memory experiences. I will discuss two versions of this 
strategy and argue that one of them attributes too much information to memories 
whereas the other one attributes too little.  
 Section four will be concerned with the belief that the remembered event took pla-
ce in the past. I will discuss a certain kind of account of the inclination to have this 
belief when one has an episodic memory. Within this account, a certain reference to 
the temporal position of the remembered event is built into the content of the corre-
sponding memory. I will discuss two versions of this strategy and, once again, argue 
that one of them attributes too much information to memories whereas the other one 
attributes too little. 
 The upshot of section three will be that the content of a memory must involve a 
particular kind of reference to the subject’s perceptual experiences. The upshot of sec-
tion four will be that the content of a memory must involve a specific kind of refer-
ence to the temporal position of the remembered event as well. In section five, I will 
offer a positive proposal about the content of memories that incorporates both fea-
tures. This proposal builds on some remarks by John Searle on the ‘causal self-
referentiality’ of memory. And it is aimed at explaining both our inclination to believe 
of remembered events that they happened in the past as well as our inclination to be-
lieve that they were perceived by us.  
 A note on terminology. In what follows, I shall use expressions of the form ‘S re-
members that p’ and ‘S has a memory that p’ to refer to a subject being in a state 
wherein she veridically remembers a certain fact. With the locutions ‘S apparently re-
members that p’, ‘S has an apparent memory that p’ and ‘S has a memory experience 
that p’, I will refer to a subject being in a state wherein she either veridically remem-
bers or misremembers a certain event. (Likewise for perception talk.)  
2. Episodic memory and semantic memory 
There are two varieties of memory for events that it is important to distinguish, since 
our explanandum only concerns one of them. An example may be useful to tell them 
apart.  
 Suppose that, when I was a child, my parents took me to the zoo of Barcelona and 
I saw Snowflake (a charming albino gorilla who lived at that zoo for many years) play-
ing there. There are two senses in which, later, I could remember that there was an al-
bino gorilla playing at the local zoo. In the first sense, I remember it because I am 
having a certain quasi-perceptual experience whereby it appears to me as if there had 
been an albino gorilla playing there. Presumably, the experience I am having when I 
remember something in this sense involves some imagery of the event and it elicits 
some awareness of it in me. In this sense, I can remember that there was an albino go-
rilla playing at the zoo even if I did not form the belief that there was one at the time I 
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perceived him. Imagine, for instance, that I did not have the concept gorilla at the time 
I visited the zoo, or that I did not pay attention to him because I was fascinated by the 
elephant in the background. It is still possible for me to remember that there was an 
albino gorilla at the zoo in this sense. 
 There is a different sense in which I may remember that there was an albino gorilla 
playing at the zoo years after my visit there. In that different sense, I remember that 
there was an albino gorilla playing at the zoo if, in the past, I formed the belief that 
there is such an animal playing at the zoo, I now believe that he was playing there, and 
the reason why I believe it now is that I believed it then. In this sense, I can remember 
that there was an albino gorilla playing at the zoo even if, at the current time, I am not 
having any quasi-perceptual experience whereby it appears to me as if there had been 
an albino gorilla playing at the zoo and, therefore, I would not now be able to answer 
questions about any detail in the scene that I did not appreciate at the time I perceived 
it. In this sense, I cannot remember that there was an albino gorilla playing at the zoo 
if I did not form the belief that there was one at the time I perceived him. 
  Let us call the first kind of cognitive achievement ‘episodically remembering’ and 
the second kind ‘semantically remembering’. Likewise, if a subject remembers a certain 
event episodically, we may call the experience she has an ‘episodic memory’ of the 
event and, if she remembers it semantically, we can call her belief that the event hap-
pened a ‘semantic memory’ of it. In this discussion, I shall concentrate on episodic 
memory. Thus, when I speak of remembering an event, I shall mean episodically re-
membering unless otherwise specified. (Similarly, talk of memories simpliciter should be 
understood as referring to episodic memories.) The issue that will concern us is, then, 
how we should construe the content of episodic memories.  
 Like perceptual experiences, episodic memories have the power to elicit certain be-
liefs in us. Thus, when we apparently remember a certain event, we are disposed to 
believe that some period of time has passed between the time at which it happened 
and the present moment. Similarly, when we apparently remember a given event, we 
are inclined to believe that it was perceived by us. We can give a quite strong formula-
tion to these two ideas in the following ‘attribution of pastness’ and ‘attribution of ex-
perience’ principles: 
 
(AP) Attribution of Pastness 
 For any subject S and proposition p: 
 If S remembers that p, then S believes that, in the past, it was the case 
that p. 
(AE) Attribution of Experience 
 For any subject S and proposition p: 
 If S remembers that p, then S believes that she has perceptually ex-
perienced that p.  
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Why are AP and AE quite strong as formulated? The reason is that both AP and AE 
should really be read as including implicit ceteris paribus clauses, since they could cer-
tainly have exceptions. Suppose that a given subject has a certain memory experience, 
but she also has what she takes to be overwhelmingly strong evidence that her expe-
rience is not a memory experience but, say, an episode of imagination. Then, she may 
form neither the belief that the event that she seems to be remembering happened in 
the past nor the belief that she perceptually experienced it. Nevertheless, in normal 
circumstances, it seems that memory experiences do elicit in us both the belief that 
the remembered events happened in the past and the belief that we have perceptually 
experienced them.  
 Both AP and AE should play a constraining role in our theorizing about the 
intentionality of memory. Any hypothesis about the content of episodic memories 
should, at least, respect those two principles. Ideally, a hypothesis about the content of 
episodic memories should illuminate why those two principles hold true. For 
methodological purposes, this means that we are entitled to require from any proposal 
about the content of episodic memories that the facts described by AP and AE do not 
emerge as mysteries if the proposal is right. And we can arbitrate among different 
proposals about the content of episodic memories based on which have some 
prospects of explaining either AE or AP, and which don’t.  
 Let me now be more precise about what I mean by a proposal about the content 
of episodic memories here. An almost trivial point about memory is that memory ex-
periences can be evaluated as true or false. For each memory experience, there are 
conditions under which it is true and conditions under which it is false. Thus, it is 
natural to think that, if you want to know what the content of a given memory experi-
ence is, you should ask yourself what it would take for it to be true. For the purposes 
of this discussion, it will be convenient to represent the truth-conditions of episodic 
memories by means of certain abstract objects, namely, propositions. I will construe 
propositions as ordered pairs of properties and objects. (As far as I can see, nothing in 
this discussion hinges on that view about the nature of propositions.) Thus, I will con-
strue the proposition that captures the truth-conditions of a certain memory experi-
ence M as an ordered pair of an object o and a property P, where o having P is meant 
to be what it takes for M to be true. I shall refer to such pairs with expressions of the 
form ‘<P, o>’. The issue that will concern us is, in those terms, what sort of objects 
and properties are the constituents of those propositions that capture the truth-
conditions of episodic memories.  
 Any given specification of the content of a memory experience should attribute 
just the right amount of information to it. By ‘the right amount’ I simply mean the fol-
lowing. If it is the case that, according to our pre-theoretic intuitions about memory, a 
given memory experience is true of a certain possible situation, then our theory should 
attribute to it such truth-conditions that the experience turns out to be true of that 
situation. Conversely, if it is the case that, according to our pre-theoretic intuitions 
about memory, a certain memory experience is false of a given possible situation, then 
our theory should attribute to it such truth-conditions that the experience turns out to 
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be false of that situation. We may call this the ‘right amount of information’ test, or 
RAI. To endorse the right amount of information test is partly to accept that, to the 
question ‘Would such-and-such possible situation make this memory experience true?’ 
one may not answer ‘It depends on what we take the content of that memory experi-
ence to be.’ Our pre-theoretic intuitions about veridicality come first. And content 
must be tailored according to those intuitions. 
 Thus, there are two types of constraints that we will need to respect when we try 
to find out what the constituents of those propositions that capture the contents of 
episodic memories are. On the one hand, it will be an important virtue of any hy-
pothesis about those constituents that it accounts for the connections between mem-
ory and belief expressed by AE and AP. On the other hand, any such hypothesis will 
need to pass the right amount of information test. 
3. Perception and Memory 
Let us start our investigation at the attribution of experience principle. If one is inter-
ested in accounting for the truth of AE, then a natural way of construing mnemonic 
content is to build a reference to the subject’s perceptual experiences into the content 
of her corresponding episodic memories. That is, one can try to account for AE by 
making a perceptual experience of a certain event one of the constituents of the con-
tent of the memory experience whereby a subject apparently remembers the event in 
question. Let us call this approach the ‘reflexive approach’ to mnemonic content. The 
reflexive approach comes in many varieties. The most popular seem to be two theo-
ries that we may call the ‘causally self-referential view’ and the ‘neutral view’ of mem-
ory. Let us consider each of them in order and evaluate them with respect to AE, AP 
and RAI.  
 According to the causally self-referential view of memory (hereafter CSR), the in-
tentional object of a memory experience is a complex causal relation, whose relata are 
the following. One of them (the cause) is the fact that the event reported as being re-
membered caused the subject to have a perceptual experience of it. The other one (the 
effect) is the event that consists in the subject having a certain memory experience, 
namely, the very experience whose content is constituted by the just specified causal 
relation. The view can be formulated thus: 
CSR 
For every subject S, memory experience M and proposition p:  
If S has a memory experience M that she would express by saying that she 
remembers that p, then the content of M is the proposition 
 <Being caused by a perceptual experience of p in turn caused by p be-
ing the case, M> 
John Searle seems to have had this view in mind when he claimed that memory is 
causally self-referential. Searle introduces causal self-referentiality as a feature of the 
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intentionality of perception. Commenting on the satisfaction conditions of a visual 
experience, he claims: 
It is part of the conditions of satisfaction (in the sense of requirement) of the visual experience 
that the visual experience must itself be caused by the rest of the conditions of satisfaction (in the 
sense of things required) of that visual experience. Thus, for example, if I see the yellow station 
wagon, I have a certain visual experience. But the Intentional content of the visual experience, 
which requires that there be a yellow station wagon in front of me in order that it be satisfied, 
also requires that the fact that there is a yellow station wagon in front of me must be the cause of 
that very visual experience. Thus, the Intentional content of the visual experience requires as part 
of the conditions of satisfaction that the visual experience be caused by the rest of its conditions 
of satisfaction, that is, by the state of affairs perceived. […] The intentional content of the visual 
experience therefore has to be made explicit in the following form: 
I have a visual experience (that there is a yellow station wagon there and that there is a yellow sta-
tion wagon there is causing this visual experience). (Searle 1983, p. 48.) 
Searle claims that this is not only a feature of the intentionality of perception but it is a 
feature of other forms of intentionality as well, such as memory. Searle does not really 
elaborate on this idea, but the following remark strongly suggests CSR: 
The memory of seeing the flower represents both the visual experience and the flower and is self-
referential in the sense that, unless the memory was caused by the visual experience which in turn 
was caused by the presence of (and features of) the flower, I didn’t really remember seeing the 
flower. (Searle 1983, p. 85).  
According to a view substantially different from CSR, the neutral view, the objects of 
our episodic memories are our perceptual experiences of past events. Thus, episodic 
memories turn out to be neutral on whether those events ‘out there’, in the world, that 
we claim to remember did happen or not. According to neutral theorists, all memory 
tells us is that we had perceptual experiences of those events. It does not really tells us 
that those events did happen. We may formulate the view as follows: 
The neutral view 
For every subject S, memory experience M and proposition p: 
If S has a memory experience M that she would express by saying that she 
remembers that p, then the content of M is the proposition 
 <Having had a perceptual experience of p being the case, S> 
This view seems to have been held, among others, by Wolfgang Von Leyden: 
It is also true that our memories, veridical and non-veridical alike, always appear to be about 
some objective past event or fact, not about our past perceptions. […] The best way to convince 
ourselves of the fact that our recollections concern our perceptions of past events, not those events themselves, is 
to take the case of a distorted or delusive perception of a certain past event and ask ourselves in 
what sense, if any, any subsequent memory purporting to have this event as its object is mistaken. 
(Von Leyden 1961, p. 61.) 
How well do CSR and the neutral view fare vis à vis AE? It is easy to see that both of 
them can account for the attribution of experience principle being true. For both of 
them take perceptual experiences of past events to be constituents of those proposi-
tions that capture the contents of our current memory experiences of those events. 
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(Actually, CSR takes several other things to be constituents of mnemonic contents as 
well. But it does not need to appeal to them in order to explain AE.) According to 
both views, the fact that I seemed to perceive them is part of what I am in cognitive 
contact with when I have memory experiences of those events. Thus, the fact that I 
am inclined to believe of those events that I now remember that I have perceptually 
experienced them is, within either CSR or the neutral view, not at all surprising. 
 Unfortunately, the ways in which the two theories build perceptual experiences 
into the content of episodic memories raise important difficulties for their prospects 
of passing the right amount of information test. As it turns out, CSR happens to attri-
bute too much information to episodic memories. The neutral view happens to attri-
bute too little. I turn to those difficulties now.  
 Let us consider CSR first. Consider the above-mentioned situation where I am 
standing at a certain spot in the zoo, looking at an albino gorilla who is playing there 
and, years later, I have a memory experience that would I express by saying that there 
was an albino gorilla playing at the zoo. Let us call this situation W1. Let P1 be the 
perceptual experience I have in W1 and let M1 be the memory that, in W1, I have 
years later. Now, consider a possible situation W2 that is, let us stipulate, exactly like 
W1 except for the fact that, in W2, the perceptual experience that I had in the past 
was not caused by the presence of the gorilla. I did have an experience that is pheno-
menologically indistinguishable from P1 when I looked at the gorilla, and an experien-
ce that is phenomenologically indistinguishable from M1 years later. (We may call 
them P2 and M2 respectively.) Plus the gorilla was there, behaving exactly as he was in 
W1. But the experience I had in W2 when I was looking at the gorilla was not caused 
by his presence but by something else. 
 Let us concentrate on M1 now. The question that RAI raises about W2 is: Is M1 
true of W2 or not? In other words, is W2 accurately represented by M1 or not? It is 
clear that, according to CSR, M1 is false of W2. What it takes for any situation to be 
accurately represented by my memory experience is that it has a certain causal history 
in that situation. And, in W2, my memory experience does not have the right kind of 
causal history. Thus, W2 turns out not to be accurately represented by M1. Our intui-
tions, though, seem to be that M1 is true of W2. W2 is, intuitively, one of those situa-
tions that M1 represents accurately. After all, the gorilla was, in W2, playing exactly as 
he was playing in W1. In W2, I was looking at him from the spot from which I was 
looking at him in W1. And he was looking to me just like he was looking to me in W1. 
So the only difference between the past scenes in W1 and W2 is that a causal relation 
between the gorilla and my perceptual experience is missing in W2. And it does not 
seem that this makes an intuitive difference to the accuracy of the respective memory 
experiences. So the relevant portion of my past life in W2 seems to be accurately re-
presented by M1. Yet CSR entails that M1 is false of W2. In this sense, CSR seems to 
attribute too much information to episodic memories.  
 The neutral view has trouble passing RAI as well. The reason is that, according to 
this view, the truth-conditions of our memory experiences do not have anything to do 
with whether the apparently perceived events that we report to remember happened 
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or not. Whether our memory experiences are true or not depends, strictly speaking, on 
whether we had the appropriate perceptual experiences in the past. It does not depend 
on whether those events that were apparently perceived actually took place. For this 
reason, it attributes too little information to memories. It is ironic that Von Leyden’s 
thought experiment in the passage above illustrates this point rather nicely.  
 Imagine, with Von Leyden, a possible situation where I have a false perceptual ex-
perience of an albino gorilla playing at the zoo. Call this situation W3 and call the per-
ceptual experience I have in it P3. Consider the subsequent memory experience that, 
in W3, I would express by saying that there was an albino gorilla playing at the zoo. 
Let us call this experience M3, and ask ourselves whether M3 is false of W3 or not. 
Von Leyden thinks that this sort of experience only ‘purports’, or ‘appears’, to have an 
objective event as its object, so his position would surely be that M3 is not mistaken. 
This is quite surprising. Suppose that my perceptual experience was false because, as it 
turns out, I was really looking at a polar bear. Then, the memory experience whereby 
it now seems to me that there was an albino gorilla playing at the zoo is surely just as 
wrong as my past perceptual experience.2 Yet, according to the neutral view, all it 
takes for a given situation to make that memory experience true is that, in that situa-
tion, I seemed to perceive an albino gorilla playing at the zoo. So M3 turns out to be 
true of W3, which is quite counter-intuitive. In this sense, the neutral view attributes 
too little information to episodic memories.  
 The upshot is that, even though reflexive theories of memory can easily account 
for AE, they do not pass RAI. Thus, whether or not reflexive theories can account for 
AP, they do not seem to deliver good candidates for mnemonic content. However, 
there is a positive lesson that we may learn from our discussion of the reflexive ap-
proach, namely, that building past perceptual experiences into the contents of corre-
sponding memory experiences is a good strategy to explain why AE holds true. We 
should keep the difficulties that RAI raised for reflexive views in mind, though. They 
illustrate that building perceptual experiences into the content of a memory experi-
ences is risky business. On the one hand, the perceptual experience cannot appear in 
mnemonic content as a mere experience that may or may not correspond to the 
world. On the other hand, it cannot appear as part of a causal chain that leads from 
the remembered event to the memory experience either.  
4. Time and memory 
Let us turn to the attribution of pastness now. If one is interested in accounting for 
AP, then a straightforward way of specifying the content of episodic memories is by 
building a reference to the temporal position of a remembered event into the content 
of the corresponding memory experience. That is, one can try to account for AP by 
                                                     
2 It is important not to collapse two issues here. One of them is whether M3 is false of W3 or not. The 
other one is whether memory malfunctioned in W3 or not. Clearly, memory did not malfunction in 
W3. But the faculty of memory need not be at fault for a certain memory to be false. The W3 sce-
nario is, so to speak, a case of inheritance of a mistake, not a case of a mistake in inheritance. 
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making a certain moment in time associated to a given event one of the constituents 
of the proposition that captures the truth-conditions of the memory experience 
whereby one remembers that event. Let us call this approach the ‘temporal approach’ 
to mnemonic content. The temporal approach comes in many varieties, depending on 
how one thinks of the reference to the temporal location of a remembered event. The 
most natural versions of this approach seem to be two theories that we may call the 
‘absolutist’ and ‘relativist’ views of memory. Let us consider them in order.  
 According to the absolutist view, when a subject seems to remember a given event, 
the event in question is presented to her as occupying a certain temporal location in-
dependently of the temporal position at which the subject has her memory experien-
ce.3 Descriptions of temporal positions of this sort will include expressions such as ‘in 
1985’, ‘on Monday’ or ‘at noon’ (as opposed to ‘twenty years ago’, ‘yesterday’ or ‘two 
hours ago’). The view can be formulated as follows: 
Absolutist view 
For every subject S, memory experience M and proposition p: 
If S has a memory experience M that she would express by saying that she 
remembers that p, then there is a non-indexically described time t 
such that t is earlier than the time of M’s occurrence and the content 
of M is the proposition  
 <Occurring at t, the fact that p>. 
This formulation of the view is meant to leave two questions open. The first of them 
is: Suppose that the fact that p took place at time t*. How close should time t be to t* 
in order for a memory experience M whose content is <occurring at t, the fact that p> 
be veridical? The reason why this question should be left open is that the answer to it 
seems to vary from memory experience to memory experience. It depends, for in-
stance, on the amount of time that has passed between the occurrences of p and the 
subject’s having M. The shorter that time is, the more inclined we are to require that t 
must be close to t* in order for M to be considered veridical. 
 Compare the following two examples. Suppose that we are enquiring about the 
truth conditions of the memory experience that I would express by saying that I re-
member starting to write this paper. And suppose that I started to write it in late Sep-
tember 2005. That was only a month ago. (It was at the time I write this, anyhow.) 
That is why we are inclined to think that, if the memory experience in question repre-
sented the event as happening in early August and, so to speak, missed for some 
weeks, it would not be veridical. If our sympathies lie with the absolutist, we will take 
the content of that memory experience to be appropriately captured by something like 
<Occurring at the end of September 2005, the fact that I started to write ‘Memory, 
Perception and Time’> instead. By contrast, suppose that we are enquiring about the 
                                                     
3 This seemed to be the guiding idea behind the so-called ‘time-tagging theories’ of memory in psychol-
ogy. See Glenberg and Swanson (1986), for instance. 
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truth conditions of the memory experience that I would express by saying that I re-
member riding a bike for the first time. Suppose it happened in, say, late 1978. Even if 
we granted to the absolutist that there is a temporal reference built into the content of 
memory experiences and that the reference in question is independent from our tem-
poral location, we would not want to count as false a memory experience that repre-
sented the event as happening in early 1979 (and missed for a few months, as it were). 
This is because the event happened many years before my apparent memory of it 
takes place. To the extent that the idea of an absolute temporal reference is plausible, 
we must allow for considerable flexibility in the degree of accuracy that we require 
from that temporal reference. Surely the absolutist must claim that, the more recent 
the remembered event is, the more accurate that temporal reference in the content 
must be. Otherwise, the absolutist view is a non-starter. 
 The second question that the formulation of the absolutist view is meant to leave 
open is: Must the moment in time that is partly constitutive of the content of a mem-
ory experience be mentioned in a date-like manner, as the examples above suggest, or 
can it be mentioned by reference to other remembered events? The reason why this 
should be left open is that the answer to that question seems to vary from memory 
experience to memory experience as well. Thus, suppose that we are enquiring about 
the truth conditions of the memory experience that I would express by saying that I 
remember starting to write this paragraph. And suppose that it’s 2:48 pm and I started 
writing it a minute ago. We are inclined to think that a memory experience that repre-
sented the event accurately (and absolutely, that is, without making reference to my 
temporal position) would not need to mention the temporal position of the event as 
2:47 pm in order to be veridical. Intuitively, it would be sufficient to refer to it as hap-
pening before some other remembered event, such as my checking my email. Thus, it 
seems that the absolutist will need to allow that, in some cases, the temporal locations 
of seemingly remembered events are presented as relative to those of other seemingly 
remembered events whereas, in other cases, they are presented in a date-like manner.  
 The two questions above raise many interesting issues about our conception of the 
structure of time and the relations between memory and that conception which, un-
fortunately, I cannot pursue here. For the purposes of this discussion on mnemonic 
content, the important feature of the absolutist view to keep in mind is that, according 
to it, a reference to the temporal location of an event is one of the constituents of the 
content of a memory experience of that event. And that reference does not mention 
the temporal position of the remembering subject, even though it may very well make 
reference to other remembered events.  
 The absolutist seems to have reasonable prospects of accounting for AP, even 
though this would be far from an easy task. Recall that there are two kinds of tempo-
ral references that the absolutist accepts: temporal references such as ‘at 2:47 pm’ and 
temporal references such as ‘right before I checked my email.’ In either case, the abso-
lutist needs to claim that, ultimately, a subject who remembers, say, starting to write a 
certain paragraph is inclined to believe that this happened in the past because she has 
certain beliefs about her own temporal location at the time of remembrance. I take it 
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that this is obvious in the former case. Why would a memory that presents my starting 
to write this paragraph as happening at 2:47 lead me to believe that I started it in the 
past if I did not think that it is after 2:47 pm now? Things are more complicated in the 
latter case, though.  
 Suppose that my starting to write the paragraph is presented to me as happening 
right before I checked my email and I believe that I checked my email in the past. 
Then, it is not surprising that I am inclined to believe that I started to write the para-
graph in the past when I remember doing it. But the question of how I came to hold 
the belief that I checked my email in the past arises at that point. If this is a memory-
based belief, then I may have arrived at it because I remember the fact that I checked 
my email as happening before some other event, which I believe to have happened in 
the past. But we may then ask how I came to believe that the event in question hap-
pened in the past, and so on. Eventually, this sort of chain must end at some event 
whose temporal location is represented in a date-like manner (if it is not to be repre-
sented by reference to my own temporal location, that is). And this takes us back to 
the former case where, as we have just seen, the absolutist must claim that AP holds 
because the subject has beliefs about her own temporal position. To the extent that 
the absolutist can make a case for the view that a subject has beliefs about her tempo-
ral position when she believes of those events that she apparently remembers that 
they happened in the past, the absolutist can account for AP through the just-sketched 
line of thought.4  
 Unfortunately, the absolutist view does not have an easier time passing RAI than 
reflexive theories did. The absolutist view seems to attribute too little information to 
memory experiences. There seem to be memory experiences and possible situations 
such that, intuitively, we would not count those situations as being accurately repre-
sented by those experiences and, yet, the proponent of the absolutist view must claim 
that they are. Recall situation W1 where I have a perceptual experience P1 whereby I 
seem to perceive an albino gorilla playing at the zoo. And, years later, I have memory 
experience M1, which I would express by saying that there was an albino gorilla play-
ing at the zoo. Let us stipulate that, in W1, P1 occurs on 7/2/1980 and M1 occurs on 
11/7/ 2005. Now, consider a possible situation W4 where I do not exist but the go-
rilla is playing at the zoo on 7/2/1980, exactly as he was playing in W1.  
 Since the advocate of the absolutist view claims that the content of M1 makes no 
reference to my temporal location, she is committed to the claim that M1 is true of 
W4 if it is true of W1. Whatever time the absolutist builds into the content of M1 in 
order to make it true of W1, the resulting content will make M1 true of W4 as well. 
Why is that? The reason is that whether or not I exist in a given possible situation is, 
                                                     
4 Contrary to what it may seem at first glance, the task is not hopeless. There is considerable evidence of 
internal processes that keep track of time through different cycles. (On internal timers, see Church 
(1984) as well as Friedman (1990).) Perhaps an argument could be constructed to the effect that such 
internal processes make beliefs about our own temporal position available to us. Thus, in Tzeng 
(1976), it is hypothesized that the outputs of some organic pacemaker might be associated with per-
ceived events, which could encode temporal information for later retrieval in memory. 
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according to the absolutist view, irrelevant to whether that situation is accurately rep-
resented by a given memory experience of mine. Thus, whether or not I exist in W4 is 
irrelevant to whether M1 is true of W4 or not. All that matters is that the gorilla is 
playing at the time that he is represented as doing it in the content of M1. And, given 
that the gorilla is playing at the same time in both W1 and W4, there is no way of con-
struing the content of M1 so that it can be true of W1 but false of W4 (no way avail-
able to the absolutist anyway). So the absolutist must conclude that M1 is true of W4 
if it is true of W1. 
 However, our intuitions are that M1 does not accurately represent W4 even though 
it does represent W1 accurately. Why doesn’t it represent W4 accurately? The reason 
is that no fact in W4 corresponds to a certain aspect of the information provided by 
M1. The relevant piece of information is that the apparently remembered event hap-
pened in the past. Granted, in W4, the albino gorilla was playing at the moment at 
which he was playing in W1. But why should that day count as being in the past in 
W4? Clearly, no fact about 7/2/1980 makes that date, as opposed to a date forty years 
later, a past date in a possible world where I do not exist. Any date, in any possible 
situation, counts as a past date (or a future date, for that matter) only relative to the 
time that counts as the current time at that situation, that is, the time at which I exist 
there. If I do not exist in W4, then there seems to be no point of reference relative to 
which 7/2/1980 can count as a past date. Thus, it seems that nothing in W4 corre-
sponds to a very salient piece of information that M1 is carrying, namely, that the 
event that I seem to remember happened in the past. The upshot is that W4 is not a 
truth-maker of M1, which suggests that the absolutist view attributes too little content 
to memory experiences.5
 According to a different version of the temporal approach, the relativist view of 
memory, when a subject seems to remember a given event, the event in question is 
presented to her as occupying a certain temporal location relative to her own. The 
view can be formulated as follows. 
Relativist view 
For every subject S, memory experience M and proposition p: 
If S has a memory experience M that she would express by saying that she 
remembers that p, then there is a period of time T such that the con-
tent of M is the proposition 
 <Occurring T-earlier than now, the fact that p>. 
                                                     
5 In (2006), I used a scenario like W4 against CSR. There, I basically argued that CSR made M1 false of 
W4 even though, intuitively, M1 is true of W4. I was not concerned with issues about time in that es-
say. And I now think that, when we consider the fact that memories present events as being in the 
past, it is not intuitive at all that W4 is accurately represented by M1. Thus, I no longer think that 
CSR is vulnerable to the objection I raised in (2006).  
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The intuitive idea in the relativist view is that a memory must represent a certain event 
as happening a certain amount of minutes, hours, days or years ago. In either case, it 
must always represent it as being separated from the instant of remembrance by a cer-
tain period of time. Basically, it represents it as being this much or that much earlier 
than now. 
 There are some intimations of this view in Edmund Husserl’s writings on memory. 
Thus, he writes (emphasis is mine):  
I remember the lighted theatre of yesterday […]. Accordingly, the theatre hovers before me in the 
representation as something actually present. I mean this, but at the same time I apprehend this 
present as lying back in reference to the actual present of perceptions now extant. […] What is remem-
bered appears as having been present, that is, immediately and intuitively. And it appears in such 
a way that a present intuitively appears which is at an interval from the present of the actual now. (Husserl 
1964, p. 82.) 
The question about veridicality and the exact length of that period of time arises here 
as well. Suppose that p took place two months before the time at which it is appar-
ently remembered. Would a memory experience whose content is <occurring three 
months ago, the fact that p> be veridical? Would a memory experience whose content 
is <occurring two months and a half ago, the fact that p>? Our intuitions suggest that 
the answer to this kind of question varies from memory experience to memory ex-
perience. And, once again, the more distant in time the seemingly remembered event 
is, the more inclined we seem to be to relax the degree of accuracy that we require 
from the period of time built into the content of the relevant memory experience. 
Thus, it does not seem that any reasonable relativist theory could offer, for each event 
p, an exact degree of accuracy that a period of time T must satisfy in order for the 
content of a memory of p to be plausibly construed as <Occurring T-earlier than now, 
the fact that p>. Here, like in our discussion of the absolutist theory, we need to con-
cede, for the sake of the argument, that if references to periods of time are constitu-
ents of the contents of memories, then there must be significant variation as to how 
precise such references are from memory experience to memory experience. For our 
purposes, the important point to remember about the relativist view is that, according 
to the view, those temporal references are relative to the temporal positions of the 
remembering subjects.  
 The relativist seems to have reasonable prospects of accounting for AP. If a mem-
ory experience of mine presents a certain event as happening earlier than now (no 
matter how much earlier), then I will be disposed to believe that the event happened 
earlier than now. And if I am disposed to believe that it happened earlier than now, 
then it is no wonder that I am disposed to believe that it happened in the past as well. 
There may be certain beliefs about the structure of time such that, if I held those be-
liefs, then they could prevent me from having the belief that the event happened in 
the past when I believe it to have happened earlier than now. But the fact of the mat-
ter is that, ordinarily, we have no such beliefs. We take it for granted that anything that 
happened earlier than now must have happened in the past. So AP emerges as a quite 
natural phenomenon if the content of memories is the content that the relativist at-
tributes to them. 
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  However, it seems that the relativist view, like the rest of views considered so far, 
does not pass RAI. The relativist view seems to attribute too much information to 
memory experiences: There are memory experiences and possible situations such that, 
intuitively, those memory experiences are true of those situations and, yet, according 
to the theory, they turn out to be false of them.  
 Consider the following case. In a certain possible situation W5, an albino gorilla is 
playing at the zoo at a certain moment in time, call it t, and you perceive him to be. 
Some time later, you travel back in time. In fact, you travel to some period in time be-
fore t. And, at some point during that period, you have a memory experience that you 
would express by saying that you remember that an albino gorilla was playing at the 
zoo. Call the experience M5. Now, is M5 true of W5 or is it false of W5? Is W5 one of 
the truth-makers of M5? Intuitively, M5 is true of W5. After all, your perception of 
the gorilla is something that constitutes part of your past life. It has certainly not be-
come a figment of your imagination just because you traveled back in time. It repre-
sents an event that belongs to your past. Your experience of that event is part of your 
life. Intuitively, then, M5 accurately represents W5. So whatever proposition expresses 
the content of M5, it should give M5 truth-conditions according to which it is true of 
W5. However, the content posited by the relativist makes M5 false of W5.6 The rea-
son is that, in W5, the gorilla is not at the zoo before the time that counts as ‘now’, 
that is, the time at which you have M5. The gorilla is at the zoo at t and, therefore, af-
ter you have M5. Thus, we are forced to conclude, quite counter-intuitively, that M5 is 
not representing the situation accurately. The upshot is that the relativist view delivers 
truth-conditions that are too demanding for memories. 
 The bottom line about the temporal approach is that temporal views seem to be 
capable of accounting for AP. However, they do not offer good candidates for mne-
monic content, whether or not they may be able to account for AE. The reason is that 
relativist views turn out to be too strict about the content that they attribute to memo-
ries whereas (ironically) absolutist views turn out not to be strict enough. A more con-
structive moral that we may draw from our discussion of the temporal approach is 
that building a temporal location into the content of a memory experience is a promis-
ing strategy for the purposes of explaining AP. That being said, the troubles that tem-
poral views had with RAI suggest that one must proceed with extreme care while pur-
suing this strategy. The reference to the temporal location of the remembered event 
must be relative to the remembering subject in order to constitute a reference to the 
past. But it cannot amount to the property of happening at a certain location relative 
to the location of the relevant memory experience in objective time.  
                                                     
6 There are a number of contents that the relativist may attribute to M5, of course. The period of time 
that, according to the content that a relativist may attribute to M5, separates the gorilla from you may 
be longer or shorter. The objection I am raising here is independent of the precise length of the pe-
riod of time that the relativist may build into the content of M5. 
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5. A positive proposal 
Let us take stock and reflect on what our discussions of the temporal and reflexive 
approaches have taught us. 
 The reflexive approach tells us that perceptual experiences can be constitutive ele-
ments of the contents of memories. The difficulties that the neutral view faced, 
though, suggest the following trade-off: On the one hand, construing mnemonic con-
tent in such a way that the content of a memory experience of an event makes no ref-
erence to our having perceptually experienced it makes accounting for AE a challeng-
ing task. On the other hand, simply building a perceptual experience into the content 
of a memory experience does not let us take the intuition that most of our memory 
experiences are about facts ‘out there’, in the world, at face value. We do not want to 
posit a kind of mnemonic content that forces us to conclude that memory cannot, as 
it were, reach beyond our skin. Making perceptual experiences part of the content of 
memories helps with AE, but we need to keep an eye on the fact that memory experi-
ences are, so to speak, opinionated. Once we seem to remember a certain event, the 
question of whether it seems to us that the event really happened or not is no longer 
open to us. Memory experiences are assertive in that, when we seem to remember an 
event, that event is presented to us as having been the case, not only as having been 
perceptually experienced to be the case.  
 This leaves us with a first dilemma, which we may call the ‘world dilemma’. Either 
we build perceptual experiences into mnemonic content or we do not. In the former 
case, it is easy to account for AE but, if we do it as the neutral theorist does, then we 
will end up concluding that memories are never about the outside world. In the latter 
case, we may preserve the commonsensical idea that memory can put us in cognitive 
contact with events that happened in the external world, but we will have a rather dif-
ficult time accounting for AE.  
 The temporal approach tells us that temporal positions can be constitutive ele-
ments of the contents of memories. The problems of the absolute view, though, sug-
gest that those temporal positions must be positions relative to the remembering sub-
jects. Otherwise, it is hard to make sense of the idea that, in memory, events are pre-
sented to us as being in the past. This is the reason why the relativist view is appealing. 
Suppose that events are indeed presented to us as occupying certain temporal loca-
tions relative to ours when we apparently remember them. This would vindicate the 
idea that a robust feature of mnemonic content is that remembered events are pre-
sented to us as being in the past. However, we have seen that building earlier-than 
temporal positions into mnemonic content makes the truth-conditions of memories 
too strict. The reason is that references to temporal positions of that sort seem to 
carry with them information about the relative positions of the remembered event and 
the remembering subject in objective time. And this seems too much information to 
attribute to memories. 
 This leaves us with a second dilemma, which we may call the ‘time dilemma’. Ei-
ther we do not build temporal locations into mnemonic content or we do. In the for-
mer case, it is going to be pretty hard to account for AP. In the latter case, it is possi-
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ble to account for AP. But the most promising strategy for this purpose seems to in-
volve building temporal positions relative to the subject’s position into the content of 
her memory experiences. Basically, these constituents of mnemonic content come 
down to the properties of happening this much or that much earlier than the memory 
occurs. And, as it has just been mentioned, this raises significant difficulties for the 
view regarding RAI.  
 CSR enjoys certain attractive features that may allow us to get out of both the 
world and time dilemmas. Unfortunately, we saw that CSR had trouble with RAI and 
veridical hallucination scenarios. To get around that kind of trouble, let us consider, 
instead, the following ‘veridically self-referential view’, or VSR. We can formulate it as 
follows.  
VSR 
For every subject S, memory experience M and proposition p: 
If S has a memory experience M that she would express by saying that she 
remembers that p, then the content of M is the proposition 
 <Being caused by a veridical perceptual experience of p being the 
case, M>. 
VSR does not have the difficulty that CSR had passing the right amount of informa-
tion test. Since, according to VSR, the content of a memory experience does not re-
quire that there is a causal link between the event that we claim to remember and our 
perceptual experience of it, VSR squares with the intuition that, in the kind of veridi-
cal hallucination scenario discussed in section 3, M1 represents the situation accu-
rately. All VSR requires from a possible situation in order to make M1 true is that, in 
that situation, the memory experience is caused by a correct perceptual experience of 
an albino gorilla playing at the zoo. And, in W2, my perceptual experience of the al-
bino gorilla is true and it is causing my memory experience. So VSR can accommodate 
the intuition that M1 is true of W2.  
 In addition, VSR borrows from CSR two features that allows the view to dissolve 
the world and time dilemmas. According to VSR, veridical perceptual experiences are 
constitutive elements of mnemonic content. This means that the content of a memory 
experience can refer to events out there, in the world, while referring to perceptual 
experiences of them at the same time. If an event is, as VSR claims, presented to us in 
memory as having been perceived, then it must be presented to us as having been per-
ceptually experienced and it must be presented to us as having been the case. The 
former aspect of mnemonic content allows us to account for AE. And the latter as-
pect of it allows us to overcome the difficulties of the neutral view. To appreciate the 
very last point, let us go back to possible situation W3. In that situation, I misperceive 
an albino gorilla playing at the zoo and, years later, I have a memory experience M3 
that I would express by saying that I remember that an albino gorilla was playing at 
the zoo. Intuitively, M3 is false of W3. And VSR can account for this intuition: The 
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perceptual experience that, in the past, I had at the zoo was not veridical. Therefore, 
M3 turns out to be, according to VSR, false of W3. Which is what we wanted. 
 In addition, according to VSR, the content of a memory experience refers to the 
experience’s own causal history. There is one leg of the causal history of memory ex-
periences that CSR builds into their contents that is missing from the kind of content 
that VSR attributes to memory experiences. This is the leg from the perceptual experi-
ence of the event that we report to remember to the event in question. But VSR does 
build part of the causal history of a memory experience into its content, namely, the 
causal history of that experience up to the perceptual experience of the event that is 
reported as being remembered. This provides us with a sense in which that experience 
can refer to the subject’s past, or her past life, even in time travel scenarios. Thus, 
consider W5 again. In W5, you have a memory experience M5 that you would report 
by claiming that an albino gorilla was playing at the zoo. But something happened at 
some point between your having a perceptual experience of the gorilla, which we may 
label P5, and your having M5: Unbeknownst to you, you traveled back in time to a 
moment before the gorilla is playing at the zoo. Now, in W5, your perceptual experi-
ence of the gorilla was correct, and it caused that experience that you are having when 
you report to remember the gorilla. Thus, according to VSR, your memory experience 
is representing the situation accurately. This squares with our intuition behind the idea 
that time-travel does not falsify the traveler’s memory experiences. This is the intui-
tion that memory provides us with information about one’s own past rather than 
information about the past. The upshot of this is that VSR can explain AP as well as 
AE. Suppose that an event is, in memory, presented to us as matching a certain 
perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that we are having. 
Then, it is presented as occupying a certain position in our personal history. That 
history goes (perhaps nomically necessarily) hand in hand with objective time. 
However, it is not logically necessary that the order of events in our personal history 
matches the order of events in objective time, as time-travel scenarios illustrate. The 
order of personal time is the order of causation and, to the extent that backwards 
causation is conceivable, the order of personal time does not logically need to match 
the order of objective time.7 What VSR tells us is that memory represents events as 
being in our own personal past, that is, as being earlier in our history. Since this 
corresponds to earlier in objective time, as a matter of natural law, it is not surprising 
that we are inclined to believe of those events that they happened in the past. But 
relative positions in objective time are not built into mnemonic content according to 
VSR. This is how VSR can avoid the difficulties of the relativist view regarding time-
                                                     
travel scenarios.  The bottom line is that VSR explains AE by building perceptual experiences into 
the contents of memories and it explains AP by building causal relations into them. 
The perceptual experiences at issue are veridical, which allows VSR to overcome the 
difficulties of the neutral view. And the causal relations do not include a causal rela-
tion between perceptual experiences and events in the world, which allows it to over-
7 For more on these issues, see Lewis (1976). 
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come the difficulties of CSR. In addition, those causal relations make reference to the 
remembering subject by making reference to the very memory experiences whose 
contents they partly constitute. This allows VSR to overcome the difficulties of the 
absolutist view. And, finally, those causal relations provide us with a sense in which 
events can be represented, in memory, as being earlier in the order of events that cor-
responds to the subject’s history without being, necessarily, earlier in the order of ob-
jective time. This allows VSR to overcome the difficulties of the relativist view. Thus, 
it seems that not only does VSR account for AE and AP, but it also seems to pass the 
right amount of information test with a pretty decent grade. 
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